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T HE Joint Resolution of Congress of June 5, 1933, abrogating the gold
clause,1 has provoked considerable and pertinent legal examination
of the subject.2 This examination has so far been restricted to a single
problem: the constitutionality of the new law. But numerous other ques-
tions are involved, such as those relating to the different types of gold
clauses, their interpretation, and their effect in the case of nonperformance
or of invalidity; and more important still, there arises the problem of de-
limiting the operative scope of the Joint Resolution itself. The disregard
of these and other inherent problems is understandable because at present
the issue of constitutionality is the dominant one. The writer, however,
will not presume to enter very deeply into the question of American con-
ifisiting Professor of Law, Columbia University; formerly Professor of Lay, Berlin
University.
1. The essential provisions of the joint Resolution read as follows: "That (a) every provi-
sion contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a
right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount
in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy;
and no such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter
incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any vuch
provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon pay-
ment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal
tender for public and private debts. Any such provision contained in any law authorizing
obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States, is hereby repemled, but
the repeal of any such provision shall not invalidate any other provision or authority con-
tained in such law.
"(b) As used in this resolution, the term 'obligation' means an obligation (including every
obligation of and to the United States, excepting currency) payable in money of the
United States; and the term 'coin or currency' means coin or currency of the United
States, including Federal Reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and
national banking associations... ." 48 STAT. 113 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. 463 (1933).
2. Barry, Gold (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 263; Collier, Gold Contracts and Legislative Power
(1934) 2 GEo. WAsHL L. REv. 303; Garris, The Gold Clause (1933) 165 A.,:.,,s 219;
Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 617; Federal
Currency Restrictions and Gold Contracts (1933) A. B. A. J. 349; Johnson, Corstitutiozal
Limitations and the Gold Standard (1933) 67 U. S. L. Ray. 187, 239; King, The Gold
Clause: Can It Constitutionally Be Abrogated By Legislation? (1934) 2 GEo. WAXs. L. Ray.
131; Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts (1933) 42 YAlE L. J. 1051; Post
and Willard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses (1933) 46 Lanv. L. Ray. 1225;
Thorpe, Contracts Payable in Gold, San. Doc. No. 43, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. (1933) ; see further
the report in Gordon, Force and Effect of Clauses Providing for Payment of Private Indebt-
edness in Gold (1933) 31 MacH. L. Rav. 953, and von Baumhauer, De gouddatsle ir. de
Americaansche wetgeving, literatuur en Rechtspraak (1933) NmERmzascHm JrrasTm.nLD
No. 43.
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stitutional interpretation; neither will any attempt be made in this article
to include a general analysis of the gold clause.3 It is proposed, first, to
contribute from the point of view of Comparative Law some thoughts and
observations to the pending discussion; and, second, to inquire into the
international repercussions of the American statute. These repercussions
appear not yet to have been considered by American commentators al.
though they constitute, in our opinion, a problem of great actual impor-
tance. The solution of this problem is to be found primarily in the doc-
trines of the Conflict of Laws and in the wording of the American statute,
but the comparative method will, it is suggested, likewise prove helpful
here. Resort to foreign analogy has, indeed, been legitimized in so far as
monetary questions are concerned, by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Juilliard v. Greenman,4 one of the legal tender cases. There the
Court in laying down the fundamental principle of nominalism, that
"A contract to pay a certain sum in money . . . may always be satisfied
by payment of that sum in any currency which is lawful money at the place
and time at which payment is to be made,"5'
expressly referred to the famous French writers, Pothier [Contract of
Sale No. 416] and Pardessus [Droit Commercial No. 204-5]. Certainly
a comparative approach has much to recommend it. Under modern
economic organization, monetary problems and issues tend everywhere
toward the same types, and even factual developments in different coun-
tries are very often similar. There is thus no reason why the experiences
of a given country and the expedients invented there should not be
utilized in another country confronted with an analogous situation.0
I
The Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, is by no means unique. As we
shall observe later on,7 most countries in which currency has undergone
a large depreciation, have by way of legislation abolished or restricted
3. An attempt at such a scrutiny may be found in NUSSBAUX, DAS GELD x TnEonm um
PRAXs DES DEUTSCEN "uND AusLmx~iscmcr RECHTS (1925) 164 et seq.; and in Nuss-
baum La Clause or dans les contrats internationaux (lectures 1933), published in (1934) 43
RECUE-. DES CoURs PRorFSsgs A L'AcADE DE DROIT INTERMATIONAL DE LA HAYE. 569
Some of the discussion and material contained in these lectures are utilized in the present
article.
4. 110 U. S. 421, 449 (1884); see Thayer, Legal Tender (1887) 1 HARv. L. REV. 73, re-
printed in LoAx EssAYs (1908) 60.
5. 110 U. S. 421, at 440.
6. This use of comparative law is, of course, not at all confined to the monetary field.
On the contrary, much progress is to be expected from a large application of the com-
parative method. See e.g., Rotondi, Dogmatic and Comparative Law (1933) 8 TULANE L,
REv. 83.
7. See notes 35-55, infra, and accompanying text.
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the gold clause. These statutes, enacted under the pressure of emergency
are, in general, provisory and very short, and leave unsettled many
problems of fundamental importance. The law of June 5, 1933, how-
ever, is more detailed and specific in character and, comparatively speak-
ing, more carefully drafted. Its text particularly differs from foreign
statutes in that it explicitly embraces "any obligation which purports
to give the obligee the right to require payment in gold or a particular
kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States
measured thereby." In this instance, Congress has evidently recognized
the distinction between a "gold coin clause" ("clause-espkces-or," "Gold-
minzklausel") and a gold value clause ("clause-valeur-or," "Goldwert-
klausel"), previously elaborated by continental theory and decisions.8
By the "gold coin clause," the debtor is bound to pay in gold coin; in
the case of a "gold value clause" he has to pay in paper, or at his option,
in any other currency an amount equal to the value of the gold coin fixed
by the promise.'
Although express gold value clauses seldom appear today in American
contracts, 10 the fact that the Joint Resolution explicitly abrogates such
clauses is of far-reaching importance; for the customary American gold
coin clause, containing a promise "to pay $1000 in gold coin of the
United States of America of the standard of weight and fineness existing
the [date follows]"' 1 must as a rule be interpreted as including a gold
8. See NussBAu-m, op. cit, supra note 3, at 164; Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 562; G6ny,
La valdit juridique de la clause 'payable en or: (1926) REv TRPnsr r DE Dnorr
Cimv 552, 574; AscmAn.r, LA MoNTA (1928) 160; Ussuo , UGESU ron RLTs%'AEsE
(Copenhagen 1933) 264.
9. There is in theory a possibility of a mere bullion contract, providing not for a
conveyance of gold coins but of a quantity of gold, to be calculated on the bads of a
sum fixed in gold currency. Such bullion contracts do not, however, occur in practice.
Sometimes indeed, the expression "bullion contract" is used for gold coin clauses.
10. There are such clauses in older contracts: (1) Lane v. Gluckauf, 28 Cal. 289 (1S5).
("Orville, August 4, 1863 ... I promise to pay to . .. the sum of $2843 in gold coin of
the standard value of 1860 of the United States of America .... And if said principal ...
is not paid in gold coin as above stated, then ... I promise to pay . . . in addition thereto
and as damages such further amount and percentage as may be equal to the difference in
value in the San Francisco market between such gold coin and paper evidence of indebted-
ness of the States or the United States, that are or may hereafter be made a legAl tender
in payment of debts by the laws of this state or the United States.") (2) Brown v.
Welch, 26 id. 116 (1866) ("... in gold or if paid in paper, the amount thereof neces-
sary to purchase the gold at the place of payment, Logansport, Ind?') (date not reported).
(3) Killough v. Alford, 32 Tex. 458 (1870), "La Grange, Texsa, March 8, 18567.
Twelve months after date we promise to pay . . . the sum of $750 . . . payable in gold
coin or the equivalent thereof in United States leg"l tender notes.'
11. The widespread variant, "of or equal to the present standard, etc." does not refer to
the value in legal currency, but to the weight and fineness of the coins, providing for the
possibility that the weight or fineness might be changed by law. Lord Romer of the
English Court of Appeal felt the words "or equal to" to be "mere surplusage." Feist v.
Sociit6 Intercommunale Beige d'Electricit6, [1933] 1 Ch. 70S.
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value clause by implication, for the protection of the creditor in case
the delivery of gold should be impossible or impracticable.
The German Reichsgericht, to be sure, has held that if a debtor
promises to pay a certain amount in gold coins, no gold value clause is
to be implied. Relying upon a strained interpretation of the German
Civil Code, this court granted discharge to certain gold debtors merely on
the ground that after the outbreak of the war, gold coins had gone out
of circulation.12 Similarly the Court of King's Bench and the Court of
Appeal of England, in deciding Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige
d'ElectricitM,3 refused to recognize the existence of an implied gold value
clause."4
But these decisions do not represent the majority view and are unsatis-
factory. From a strict contractual point of view, the aim of the gold
clause is to secure to the creditor in all events an amount of legal tender
equal to the actual market value of the promised gold coins." Other-
wise the gold clause would lose its effect in the very contingency in antici-
12. Judgments of January 22, 1922, 103 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
384; of March 1, 1924, 107 id. 371; of May 24, 1924, 108 id. 176. The argument rests
on par. 245 of the German Civil Code, providing: "If a debt has to be paid in a particular
kind of coin which is, at the time of payment, no longer in circulation, the payment must
be made as if the particular kind of coin was not provided." The construction of this
rule, as made by the Reichsgericht, seems incorrect. See NUSSBA'um, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 84 et seq.
13. [1933] 1 Ch. 684.
14. The same mistake was made in Irving Trust v. Hazlewood, 148 Misc. 456, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1933) and in some French and Belgian decisions. See Nussbaum, supra
note 3, at 587, 593.
15. Post and Willard, supra note 2, at 1234, suggest five possible "reasonable" con-
structions of the customary American gold clause as mentioned before: (1) that It Is a
pure bullion contract; (2) that it is a single obligation to deliver gold coins containing
the amount of gold-as indicated by the agreement; (3) that it is an alternative obligation,
with an option in the obligee to take gold coins or their value in paper dollars; (4) that
it is an alternative obligation, with a corresponding option in the obligor; (5) that It Is
a single obligation to pay the nominal amount of the debt in any form the obligor chooses.
The authors prefer the third construction. The creditor would thus be entitled to the
nominal amount in paper currency even if the debtor, as happened in Butler v. Horwitz, 7
Wall. 258 (U. S. 1868), and Dewing v. Sears, 11 Wall. 379 (U. S. 1870), should insist,
in case of adverse judgment, on making payment in coins. This is discordant with the
above decisions of the Supreme Court, and unjustifiable in itself. Under the gold clause
as described, the debtor has a right to make payment in gold. It may be remembered that
under special conditions, as those existing in Sweden during the World War, the value of
paper currency may even exceed that of gold. Cf. CASSEL, DAs GELDWflSEN NACII 1914
(1925) 63 et seq.; Nolde, "La monnale en droit international public" (1929) 27 REcUEIL
DES Cours PROFESSES L'AcAD9 aF D=aor INTERNATIONAL DR LA HAYE 386. We therefore
prefer a sixth construction, as explained in the text. The obligation of the gold debtor should
be considered to be a single one purporting primarily a conveyance of gold coins, but
requiring, in case of the impossibility of that, conveyance of an equivalent amount of any
legal tender.
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pation of which it had been inserted; it would, in fact, be wholly inopera-
tive. 6
For this reason, the Supreme Courts of Denmark and Finland,'7 the
Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 8 the Permanent Court of
International Justice,' 9 and the English House of Lords -'0 (reversing
the decisions of the two lower British courts in the Feist case) have all
held that a gold value clause must be implied. Of particular importance
is the decision of the House of Lords, for the phraseology of the gold
clause involved in the Feist case is exactly the same as that of the cus-
tomary American one. And although the finding that the parties had
really intended to use a gold value clause was rested upon the particular
circumstances of that case, 21 the judgment is nevertheless of general sig-
nificance for the reason that circumstances of this kind exist in practically
every case where a gold clause is incorporated into a contract. 2  Accord-
16. The District Court of Colorado, in Kennedy v. Conrad, 78 Cong. Rec, April 4, 1934,
at 6107, points out that in case the conveyance of gold coins is legally impoz ile, the
creditor would not be entitled to the equivalent in other legal tender. He "would not . ..
buy the gold equivalent therewith .... If he had the gold equivalent, he would have to
turn it to some Federal Reserve Bank and at par. His government could get the profit or
increase, but the plaintiff could not." This is not the point. The plaintiff, in the case
assumed, does not claim damages for nonperformance, but payment on the ground of an
implied gold value clause, determined to operate even in the case of performance being
impossible. However, the attempt made by the Colorado judge is new and shrewd. The
French courts derive the invalidity of the gold value clause from the assumption that it
impugnes the "cours force" of the banknotes as well as the gold coin clause does; see notes
123-125, infra, and text above them.
17. Supreme Court of Denmark, decision of January 21, 1933, in Zmrrsc~mmnr rui Aus-
LANDISCHEs u-ND INTE=umATIONALES PaivAn cmr, 960 ("the payments are to be made
in gold"); and the Supreme Court of Finland, decision of January 18, 1933, id. at 467
(to pay "in Finnish goldmark of the weight and fineness as provided by the monetary law
of December 21, 1925").
18. Stavrides v. Grebenaroff, 6 Recueil des Dicisions de Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes,
317 [to pay "500 napohions of 20 French gold francs, in coin"].
19. Cour permanente de justice internationale, July 12, 1929, (1929) Jom:. Dn. L:r., 977.
20. [1934] A. C. 161.
21. The same attempt is made by the Danish court. See note 17, supra.
22. The House of Lords in the Feist case went so far as to hold the said clause to he a
pure gold value clause, since at the time the contract was made no gold coins were in
circulation. But there is no reason why the creditor, by virtue of the clause at i 3ue,
should not be entitled to a conveyance of gold coin, in case gold currency had been reestab-
lished. And no argument against the existence of the gold clause can, contrary to the
opinion of the court, be derived from the fact that a fractional amount of the interest due
(5 shillings for half a year) could not be paid in gold. Otherwise a real gold coin clause
would be practically impossible. Such a clause, reasonably interpreted, is not inconsistent
with some minor remainders being paid in currency. The same argument as advanced
by the House of Lords has been set forth by the Permanent Court in the Serbian and
Brazilian case, supra note 19, and the Swiss Federal Court in the Heraclea Company case,
judgment of February 11, 1931, (1931) JomuR. Dn. LNT. 510. In the latter case, however,
the debt was payable in "piastres-or.' This being a money of account ("rmonnaie de
compte"), a pure gold value clause should have been held existent.
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ingly, at least if one may judge by comparative law, the fact that the
American Joint Resolution contains a phrase expressly abrogating gold
value clauses is of great significance. Were it not for such express
statutory abrogation, non-existent in England, courts adjudicating cases
governed by American law might well be expected, by implying the ex-
istence of a gold value clause, to reach the same result as did the House
of Lords in the Feist case.
If the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, is constitutionally sustained in
its effort to render inoperative both gold coin and gold value clauses, it
will constitute a virtual release of debts, a "aaa6xem" on the largest
scale ever recorded. On the basis that American bonds containing the
gold clause exceed 100 billion dollars, more than 40 billion in nominal
amount (though not necessarily in purchasing power) have been viti-
ated.' This must be borne in mind, not only to understand the financial
and historical importance of the Joint Resolution, but also to realize
that the Act is not chiefly a technical monetary measure, as the title and
preanible suggests, but in reality a release of debts, and an encroachment
upon the law of contract. This fact raises constitutional difficulties. The
preamble proclaims that it is "the declared policy of the Congress to
maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar, coined or issued
by the United States, in the markets and in the payments of debts."
This conforms to the title indicating the aim of the Joint Resolution "to
assure uniform value to the coins and currency" of the United States.-4
Thus the technical monetary aspect of the law is intimated. But in
fact the Joint Resolution did not establish any "equal power" or "uniform
value" of gold dollar and paper dollar, for gold dollar coins had ceased
to be legal tender either from the date of Mfirch 6, 1933 (President's
proclamation making it illegal to pay out, export, earmark or permit the
withdrawal or transfer of gold) or at latest from the date of April 5,
1933 (President's order requiring the delivery of gold and gold coins to
the Federal Reserve Banks). "5 The Joint Resolution did not alter this
situation at all. It was of no assistance in eliminating divergencies in
the value of existing kinds of circulating media, because at the time the
Resolution was passed only one medium, namely paper dollars, was in
circulation.
23. N. Y. Herald Tribune, April 23, 1933, § 2, at 8, col. 1, gives these approxi-
mate figures of gold obligations: 22 billion dollars, U. S. A. security bonds; 16 billion
dollars, state and municipal bonds; 12 billion dollars, foreign dollar bonds. The remaining
more than S0 billion dollars are corporation bonds and real estate mortgages. But this
refers only to bonded gold obligations. The statistics were compiled, the writer understandsj
by the Institute of International Finance, New York. See also Hanna, supra note 2, at 633n.
24. Similar views had previously been set forth by Thorpe, supra note 2.




Even if gold coin had kept its status as legal tender, no legal parity
would have been reestablished by the Joint Resolution because parity in
law would have followed in any event from the fact that the coins were
legal tender. 6 And certainly the Joint Resolution does not establish
any factual parity; for notwithstanding the Resolution, gold coins still
have a greater economic value. Economic parity can only be established
either by a deflationary monetary policy or by legal reduction of the num-
ber of grains of gold in the gold coin itself, as has since been done by
the President's order of January 31, 1934.7
Still less tenable is the argument in behalf of the Joint Resolution ad-
vanced by the United States District Court in In re Missouri Pacific Rr.
Co. 2 ' This court, declaring that the subject matter of the gold clause
was a mere commodity, placed the abrogation of the gold clause in the
same category as the prohibition of the possession of opium. The diffi-
culty with this view is that in the case of a gold clause, money and not
a commodity, is owed by the debtor.29  But even if the court were cor-
rect in believing gold coin to be a commodity, its argument would sustain
the constitutionality of only the portion of the Joint Resolution relating
to gold coin clauses, not the portion relating to gold value clauses.
However, constitutional justification for the Joint Resolution can be
found in another line of argument. The strict enforcement of these
billions of dollars' worth of gold clause obligations against hard pressed
debtors would precipitate increased bankruptcies and increased liquida-
tion of securities and loans. The result might be a collapse of the bank-
ing system and, in further consequence, a monetary crisis; and this
would possibly affect the value of money. In measure as the Joint Reso-
lution tends to prevent the development of such a crisis, it may be justified
26. This was the situation during and shortly after the Civil War. Then, greenbacls
and coined dollars were simultaneous legal tender, and both of them were in circulation,
although gold coins were at a varying agio. Nevertheless there was equivalence in law,
Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 251 (U. S. 1868). Dollar notes and coined do "lla had
legal parity, and it was for debtors only a matter of economic expediency not to pay in
gold coins. Therefore Bronson v. Rodes is no longer applicable. Irving Trust v. Hazle-
wood, 148 Misc. 456, 265 N. Y. Supp. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1933). The same thing is true of the
sovereign and the paper pound in England at the present time.
27. N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1934, at 1, col. 1 (Proclamation No. 2072).
28. 7 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Mo. 1934).
29. Thompson v. Butler, 95 U. S. 694 (1877), interpreting Bronson v. RodLs, 7 Wall.
229 (U. S. 1868); Howe v. Nickerson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 400, 402 (1367) (excellent
opinion delivered by justice Gray); New York Court of Appeals in Norman v. Baltimore
& Ohio Rr. Co., N. Y. L. J, July 19, 1934, at 1, col. 1; House of Lords in the Feis
case, supra, note 11; the same opinion in Nuss nAu_, op. cit. supra note 3, at 81. Under
common law the main point is that if a money obligation is not performed, recovery of
damages is limited to legal interests. Wilson v. Morgan, 27 N. Y. Supar. Ct. (4 Rbt.) 58,
68 (1866); American Chicle Co. v. Somerville, 50 Ont. L. R. 517, 525 (1921).
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as an exercise of Congress's implied power to establish and protect a
banking system,80 and of its express power to regulate the value of money
in the United States.81 But this, of course, does not mean that the statute
is essentially a technical monetary one, for the value of the dollar may
be influenced by measures of many different kinds, for example, by altera-
tions of the law of contracts.
There still remains the constitutional problem of whether the Joint
Resolution violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As bearing upon this problem it is appropriate to inquire into the
reasonableness of statutory abrogation of gold clauses. After the country
went off the gold standard, prices measured in terms of gold value
rapidly declined, 2 increasing considerably the purchasing power of the
gold dollar. The maintenance of gold debts therefore would have involved
economically an undeserved surplus for the creditor. He could not claim
any particular merit in having stipulated for gold, for the clauses had
become in American practice a matter of custom since the beginning of
the Republic.3 The debtor, in submitting to the gold clause, did not in
general get a "consideration" or any compensation for taking over the
whole monetary risk. Nevertheless, he could perhaps be expected to
abide by the stipulation if his general economic condition had remained
unchanged or had improved. But the contrary happened. A very great
number of debtors were, because of the depression, no longer able to
meet debts even at the nominal amount. Now it was felt to be morally
and economically unsound to drive these honest debtors into bankruptcy
by upholding gold clauses. 4 Such arguments might be insufficient for a
court; therefore the legislature had to intervene.
The strength of these considerations is attested by the fact that so
many other countries have, at one time or another, abrogated or restricted
30. Under the doctrine developed in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
31. The Copenhague Court in the case of the Copenhagen Telephone Co., not yet
published, uses a still different argument to justify the Resolution as a regulation of the
value of money. It points out that maintenance of the gold value clauses would cause a
diminution of the gold cover of American currency, meaning probably that the maintenance
of the clauses could provoke a strong demand for currency possibly affecting the proportion
between gold reserves and notes in circulation. But there is in the Congressional data
neither a statement nor even a suggestion to the effect that such an argument was con-
sidered by Congress. Indeed, payments for bonds and mortgages are generally not made In
cash.
32. See index of wholesale commodity prices on a gold basis, currently published in Tn.
ANALsTr WryxLy, e.g. Dec. 29, 1933, at 838.
33. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 617, n. 20.
34. This viewpoint is expressed by the Federal District Court in In re Missouri Pacific
Rr. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E. D. Mo. 1934).
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gold clauses: Belgium,is Egypt,30  Germany,37  Italyps Roumania,'
Greece,4" Jugoslavia,' Bulgaria,"2 Mexico,4 3 Costa Rica,4 Sweden,"
Esthonia,6 Austria,47 Columbia,4 s Guatemala 49 and Cuba."o
In France no such statute was originally enacted, but the French courts
held void any gold clause except one involving a so-called "international
payment" ("r~glement international"), and this ruling was made statu-
tory by the stabilization law of June 25, 1928.1' The exception made for
international payments operates, however, preponderantly against foreign
debtors, since as a matter of fact it is mostly foreign debtors who have
undertaken gold obligations on behalf of French creditors; French
debtors obligated to make gold payments under international contracts
are not frequently to be found. 2 Besides this, the notion of "interna-
35. Aug. 2, 1914. See NUSSBA.Tt, VERESAGIiciER ScHUTZ roV3E Scirv,,u,"-CE! DES
GEaDwanES (1928) 80. The ordinance of August 2, 1914 was upheld by a decree of
October 25, 1926, 1926 BuLrrL UsuEL DEs Lois 277, art. 7.
36. Aug. 2, 1914 (1933) JouRN. DR. IirN. 1063.
37. Sept. 28, 1914, 1914 Reichsgesetzblatt 417.
33. By several decrees issued in 1916-1921. Cf. NussDAUSS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 8 et
seq.
39. Dec. 21, 1916. See NussmAir, op. cit. supra note 35.
40. May 11-15, 1917. See Tn&idis (1923) JouMT. DR. IT. 1013, and (1920) REv.
DR. INr. PR-vi 29.
41. April 24, 1920. Quoted by the Supreme Court of Austria in the judgment of
Oct. 9, 1930 (1931) DE REcHTsPREcHuNG 15.
42. May 12, 1921. See Madden and Nadler, The Gold Clause, B.Waos' (June 6, 1932) 10.
43. July 25, 1931. 7 Diaro oficial of Mexico, July 27, 1931, n. 23.
44. Jan. 15, 1932. La Gazeta, Jan. 16, 1932.
45. June 15, 1932. See "Svensk Forfattningssamling" (1932) No. 212.
46. July, 1933. See Barry, supra note 2, at 303, n. 81.
47. By a series of ordinances promulgated in 1933. The Austrian system is extremely
complicated. See Loeb and Ritter von Komorczynski-Ozzycnski, D= RE ELu..G DEf Frxem-
wsium cs- nam GorzscH v VERn X-mrsSE (Vienna, 1933). A short survey may h
found in (1933) 8 ZrMrrsc XuR AUSLANDISCHEES "MID MEMINATIONALES PMIATnhEHT
464.
48. Nov. 28, 1933. Diario oficial, No. 22455, Dec. 5, 1933.
49. April 26, 1934. Diario de Centro America, May 3, 1934.
50. May 23, 19934. Gazeta Oficial, May 23, 1934.
51. (1928) BULL=z- DES Lois DE LA RfPUBLIQuE FmimE 1631.
52. Several French gold loans, particularly governmental ones were placed in the
United States after the War. Ftirthermore there are certain Alsace-Lorrainers, who
in German times undertook gold mortgages on behalf of Swiss banks. Cour de Ca--ation
(Civ.) Jan. 23, 1924, (1924) Joum. DR. Ir. 685. A number of minor French com-
panies had issued bonds payable in francs, at the option of the holder, in certain
French and Swiss places, in order to have them quoted on French and Swis. stock
exchanges. After the depreciation of the French franc, the debtor companies declared
that they would pay French francs, but it was duly held that, the holder having decided for
payment in Switzerland, the debt was to be discharged in Swiss francs. Compgnaie ilectrique
de la Loire et du Centre, Cour de Cassation, June 19, 1933 (1933) II. Gazette du Palais 363;
Compagnie Est Lumifre, Appellate Court of Paris, Jan. 7, 1932, id. 1932 I. 651; Tap?±teries
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tional payment" or, as the French often say, "international contract," is
very vague, and productive of arbitrary decisions which are disagreeable
in international relations. The French were to learn that themselves.
The Congo State raised in 1901 a loan in Belgium and France. The
individual bonds were made payable in gold francs in Brussels at the
Treasury of the Congo State and in Paris at Rothschild's. The gold
clause having been abrogated by the Belgian statute of 1914, the French
creditors argued that this law could not concern international contracts.
The Belgian courts-the Court d'Appel, at Brussels, and the Cour de
Cassation-adopted the French thesis but defined the loan as a domestic
one.53  They held immaterial the fact that the bonds were payable in
Paris, and they did not even mention the admission of the loan to official
quotation on the Paris Bourse. The French creditors, not fully pleased
with the decision, brought an action in Paris against the Belgian State
as the successor of the former Congo State. When the Belgian govern-
ment defended on the ground that the principle of extraterritoriality
protected it from suit in any but its own courts, protest was voiced in the
French press.54 However, by French courts too, the notion of "inter-
national payment" has in addition been arbitrarily interpreted to the
detriment of foreigners. 55
Berg~s, Appellate Court of Besanqon Dec. 30, 1931, id. 1932, I. 656. In the case of the
Sod6t6 Anonyme de Sochaux, however, the same Besanqon court, with different judges sit-
ting, gave judgment for the company, Dec. 28, 1931, id. 1932 I. 655. Gold clauses were not
incorporated in any one of the bonds mentioned.
53. The judgment of the Cour de Cassation, Ire Ch., dated April 27, 1933, is reported
in (1933) JouRN. DR. INT. 739.
54. See Le Temps, Oct. 16 and Nov. 22, 1933.
55. An example was given in Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 603. And very strange seems
to me the decision of the Cour de Cassation, Chambre Civile, dated November 7, 1932,
(1933) JouRN. DR. INT. 1197, duly criticized by Professor Perroud, at 1200. In some casen
foreign insurance companies, obligated in gold on behalf of French policy holders, were
granted the benefit of the abrogation of the gold clause: Cour de Cassation, June 30, 1931,
Gazette du Palais, 1931 II. 378; Aug. 1, 1932, id. 1932 II. 721; Appellate Court of Paris,
Ire Ch., Dec. 31, 1926, (1927) JouRN. DR. INT. 104. But French practice can scarcely
be given credit for these decisions, since the contracts were made by the said companies'
French branches, which had been put under French regulation and control, by a French
statute of March 17, 1905, in order to "frenchify" their business: Cour de Cassation, June 30,
1931, and Tribunal civil de la Seine, ire Ch., Apr. 13, 1929, (1929) JoUMn. DR. INT. 1316.
Since the French branches were deprived by virtue of French law of the benefits of the gold
clauses with regard to their French investments imposed on them by the statute of March 17,
1905, they were, as quasi-French enterprises, to be protected accordingly against the gold
claims of the policy holders, even from a French nationalistic viewpoint. Notwithstanding,
the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, in the case of a policy made in 1901 with an
English life insurance company and phrased plainly in francs, held not only that an
"International payment" was involved but also assumed by misconstruction (cf. Cour
de Cassation, Nov. 28, 1932, Gazette du Palais, (1933) I. 271, concerning a French life
insurance company) a tacit gold clause: Judgment of May 6, 1929, Tribunal de Commerce
de ]a Seine, Ire Ch. (1929) JouwR. DR. INT. 1318. In this case, however, the policy was
signed partly in London, partly in Paris.
GOLD CLAUSE ABROGATION
In England the gold clause up to the present has not been restricted
by statute. In the Feist case, however, the High Court and the Court of
Appeal tried, as mentioned before,13 to eliminate a perfectly clear gold
clause. The three judges of the Court of Appeal delivered separate
opinions, using in part very forced constructions, and differing from each
other as well as from the court below, but their conclusion was unanimous.
The House of Lords, however, reversed the decision for irrefutable
reasons, since no statute comparable to the American Joint Resolution
existed in English law. Thus the gold clause was reestablished in English
contracts. But it must be remembered that in English contracts, con-
trary to American custom, the gold clause very seldom appears. Thus,
in the Feist case, it was a Belgian company that had obligated itself
under a gold clause. By virtue of this fact, explicable by historical
reasons,56 the problem of the gold clause for England has a quite minor
economic importance.
There are several foreign decisions which have passed on the legal per-
missibility of statutes of the same or comparable nature as the American
Joint Resolution. In Greece a decree of July 21, 1914, provided that
debts contracted in Turkish livre-or (a gold coin) and payable in Greece
were to be discharged in Greek paper drachmes at a ratio of 22 drachmes
for one livre-or (apparently an under-par ratio). The Court of Appeal at
Saloniki held that the decree did not constitute an unconstitutional
deprivation of property,57 but was justified on the ground that the state"
was entitled to regulate the rate of foreign exchange, so that debtors
would be protected against excessive damages resulting from the fluctua-
tion of the value of gold. Obviously it would seem inconsistent to grant
the legislature less power over domestic currency. Another interesting
decision of some relevance is that of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal. A British national, a widow who had been before the war a
creditor of a gold debt under German law, sued the German government
for damages on the ground that by the ordinance of September 28, 1914,
it had abrogated gold clauses. The argument ran that this ordinance
was an "exceptional war measure," entitling the injured national of an
allied power to compensation under Article 297e of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.59 The court dismissed the claim, not considering the ordinance
56. Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 567, 570.
57. Judgment dated Dec. 9, 1922 (1923) JouRN. DR. L'-T. 1013. Cf. Court of Athens,
Judgment of 1933, (1934) Joum,. DR. INTu. 185, in which reestablishment of gold claus: by
Greek decree of July 10/August 5, 1931, was held constitutional. See DAREsTfruE LES cO:.-
STiTUTiONS miODERNES (Paris, 1928) 625 et seq.
58. The French translation reads "le pays?'
59. This article reads as follows: "The nationals of allied and associated Powers shall
be entitled to compensation in respect of damage or injury inflicted upon their prop2rty
rights or interest... in German territory as it existed on August 1, 1914, by the applica-
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as an "exceptional war measure.""0
Reflecting thus on the legal developments within other countries and
contemplating the particular conditions of American law and practice,
we cannot consider the Joint Resolution to be an unprecedented or ex-
cessive measure. The American Congress, like other legislatures, could
not but attempt to mitigate by restriction of the gold clause the danger-
ous consequences of severe depreciation of the monetary unit. It can
scarcely be believed that any constitution should make it impossible to
meet so exigent a situation.
These general considerations undoubtedly are relevant also for
foreign courts in which the question of the constitutionality of the Ameri-
can Joint Resolution has been or will be raised."1 Of course after the Su-
preme Court in Washington has answered the question, its decision will
be authoritative for foreign courts. Even such jurisdictions as claim
the power to interpret foreign law differently from courts of the country
of origin 2 would, in applying American law, refrain from doing so, as the
law-making power of the Supreme Court is everywhere well known. But
until the Supreme Court has reviewed the case, foreign courts are free
to inquire into the constitutionality of the Joint Resolution. As a practi-
cal matter, however, no such difficulty may be expected to arise; for no
foreign tribunal is likely to reach an adverse decision on this point. A
decision of a Viennese Court of first resort, dated March 1, 1934, in the
case of the International Federal Loan of Austria (1930, American sec-
tion), may be advanced as an example.13  The defendant, the Austrian
tion . . . of the exceptional war measure or measures of transfer mentioned in para-
graphs 1 and 3 of the Annex hereto." The paragraphs of the Annex are meaningless for
the question before us.
60. Julia Meyer v. German Government, Dec. 10, 18, 1924, 4 REcuM DS D-McsioNs
666. In fact, the court argued that the ,German government, by having neither discon-
tinued nor stayed the decree as required with regard to exceptional war measures by art.
297e, had indicated its opinion that the decree was not an exceptional war measure; and
the court held further that it was not competent to interfere with the conduct of the
German government. This seems very strained since the court was to determine whether
or not an exceptional war measure existed, regardless of any government's opinion. Any-
way, the conduct of the German government has, in this instance, been disapproved of,
directly or indirectly, neither by the tribunal nor by the allied governments.
61. (1933) Jou R. DR. INr. 554. Mr. Boris Shatzky, former professor at the Uni-
versity of Petrograd, at present instructor of American Constitutional law at the Sor.
bonne, strongly advises foreign creditors to challenge the constitutionality of the Joint
Resolution in their own courts. He adds: "The combined pressure of European deci-
sions and of American jurisdiction might be sufficient to get tangible results in the
question of payment of the debts contracted for."
62. That is true for German and Austrian jurisdiction. Cf. NussiAum, Dauiscum.
INTmNATiONALES PRrVATREc T (1932) 99.




government, invoked the Joint Resolution, but in rebuttal the claimant,
a bondholder, contested its constitutionality. The court, reserving
its right to an independent examination of the question, pointed out that
the claimant had not sufficiently substantiated the rebuttal, saying:
"The Sth Amendment, 'No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law' contains in its first part-the second re-
ferring to expropriation-not a rule of substantive but only of constitutional
law; therefore the assertion of unconstitutionality cannot be based upon it."c
This argument seems to us utterly inconsistent and obscure, but it
indicates the conceivable reluctance of the court to plunge into problem-
atical depths. At present we have already three American judgments,
one of a federal court,' one of a Colorado court,oa and one of the New
York Court of Appeals"5 affirming constitutionality, only the Ohio Court
of Common Pleas holding to the contrary.60 As to American commenta-
tors, Professor Collier in his able paper has reached the same result, while
other writers without taking a definite position seem partly to incline
towards the same solution.T Under such circumstances I think it prac-
tically out of the question that the constitutionality of the Joint Resolu-
tion will be denied by a foreign court, except on the ground of an
American ruling.
II
We have in our previous discussion approached slightly the problem of
the international repercussions of the Joint Resolution, a problem to
which we may now devote ourselves in greater detail. The importance of
charting the operative extent of the Resolution is manifest when it is
recalled that a great part of the creditors as well as the debtors of the
bonded loans issued in the United States are foreigners residing abroad.
For example, many capitalists in Europe, and probably in other countries
as well, by reason of domestic monetary troubles bought American gold
bonds in the belief that they would get by them protection against any
depreciation. But that is far from being all. In addition to the bonds,
doubtless numerous business relationships between American and other
people have been carried out on a gold dollar basis. This basis has even
64. In re Missouri Pacific Rr. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1 (1934).
64a. Kennedy v. Conrad, supra note 16.
65. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., N. Y. L. J., July 19, 1934, at 1. This
decision was recently followed by the Supreme Court of New York in Levy v. Ash-ts ,
Ltd., N. Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1934.
66. Judgment dated March 10, 1934, in Equitable Life Ins. Society v. Fr,-dz, 73 Cong.
Rec., March 15, 1934, at 4622. The court argues that the abrogation of the gold dau-
would amount to confiscation of creditors' property without compensation. The court holds
such confiscation cannot be intended, and is not provided for, by the statute. The a--ump-
tion of unconstitutionality is here, of course, poorly disguised.
67. Cf. Hanna; Post and Willard, both supra note 2.
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been widely adopted in contracts made exclusively between non-Amerl-
cans-for instance, in domestic and foreign insurance. In all these rela-
tionships the question arises whether the Joint Resolution must apply,
or the law of one of the many nations which have not restricted the effect
of gold clauses at all, or which have abrogated merely gold coin clauses
and not gold value clauses."8 Thus both the financial importance of the
Resolution and its possible territorial extent are quite unprecedented in
legal history.
The Conflict of Laws
In exploring the limits within which the Joint Resolution operates, we
must first examine the pertinent rules of the Conflict of Laws in an
attempt to discover what kinds of contracts are governed by American
law. On this point important precedent is afforded by a decision of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. Before the World War, Serbia
had floated several issues of bonds, made payable in "francs-or" (gold
francs) at different places." Some of these places, for instance Berlin
and Vienna,7 were situated outside the territories of the Latin monetary
union, the unit of which was the "franc." If the holder presented the
bond at such a place, he had to receive in the local currency the value of
the francs fixed in the bond (or in the coupons thereto) at the current
rate of exchange on Paris. Similar bonds had been issued before the
war by the Brazilian government. When the French courts, subsequent
to the depreciation of the franc, held the gold clause to be void, the debtor
governments refused to pay more than the face declaration of francs (or
the value thereof in local currency) as indicated on the bonds and
coupons. The French government, acting in the interest of French bond-
holders, rejected this defense. Therefore the French government on the
one hand, and the Serbian and Brazilian on the other hand, agreed to
submit the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague. The court gave judgment for the French government. It
pointed out that the loan contracted by a state is governed generally by
the law of that state, provided it has not submitted to some other law.
This having not happened in the case at bar, Serbian law would be
68. The German ordinance of September 28, 1914, has been construed as referring
only to gold coin clauses, German Supreme Court, Dec. 3, 1924, Ju~is77scna WocMENscUM-r,
(1925) 1483; likewise the Egyptian ordinance of August 7, 1914, Civil Tribunal of Alex-
andria, March 21, 1933 (1933) Joum. DR. INT. 1058. In the German case, the gold
clause, nevertheless, was held completely ineffective, according to the theory of the Relchs-
gericht discussed in text accompanying note 12, supra.
69. I lay aside doubts regarding the contractual currency dissolved by the courts as
stated above.
70. The individual issues of the bonds are somewhat differently phrased in terms of
place of payment and other points, but those differences are quite immaterial in law.
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applicable to the loans71 with respect to the "substance of the debt."
Nevertheless it was the opinion of the court that "the money in which
the payment must or may (doit or peut) be made in France depends on
French law." "Indeed," continued the court, "it is commonly accepted
that each state is entitled to determine itself its own currency." - There-
fore French law would govern the gold clause, which consequently must
be upheld as resting on an "international contract." 3
The shortness of this fundamental proposition contrasts with the copi-
ousness of the court's argument upon minor points. There are doubts
as to what the court really means. Shall French law apply because the
basic currency of the loan is French, or because the place of payment
is situated in France? Or have both those facts together been considered
as decisive?
However, neither singly nor combined are they sufficient to justify
the opinion of the Court. Untenable at any rate would be the proposi-
tion that would make the validity of the gold clause dependent upon
the law of the state in the currency of which the amount of the debt
has been fixed, (upon the "Wiffirungsstatut,") as opposed to the "Schuld-
statut,"'74 the law governing the obligation as a whole. If this proposi-
tion should be the real meaning of the judgment, the Court might pos-
sibly have been influenced by the conception that the law abrogating the
gold clauses formed part of the monetary system in reference to which
the parties had contracted. ("The State is entitled to determine itself
its own currency.") 75  This, in any case, would be wrong when the
abrogation, as under French and American law, extends to gold value
clauses. In such case, as we have already indicated, not a monetary
rule, but a rule of the law of Contract is involved.
But even when only gold coin clauses are affected by the law, the
"Wiffrungsstatut" could not control the case. We mentioned before
71. And Brazilian law to the Brazilian loan. We do not henceforth mention the latter,
since the argument is quite the same as in the Serbian case.
72. Cour permanente de justice internationale de la Haye, (1929) Joumxu. Dr. Tk;. 100S.
73. Under Serbian law the gold clause was probably void, according to the Serbian
statute of April 24, 1920, mentioned before. The Serbian government, however, did not,
in the hearings, refer to the statute. Whether there were political considerations for not
doing so or whether the Serbian statute did not cover governmental loans, I cannot dis-
cover, as I could not ascertain the whole text of it. In general, the defense of a debtor
state derived from its own laws is good, inasmuch as the law of the state is applicable,
infra page 85. As the Serbian state did not avail itself of the defense but on the contrary
sought protection under French law, the court's decision, in its result, may be justifiable
by reasons of procedure. Even those reasons do not dearly come out in the opinion.
We are contemplating only the arguments of substantive law advanced by the court.
74. In German legal terminology "Statut" means a territorial legal system as oppzsad
to other territorial legal systems; "Wfhrung" means a monetary system.
75. See note 72, supra.
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that numerous contracts without any substantial relationship to Amer-
ican territory have been made between European parties in terms of
gold dollars. It would be obviously unjustifiable to apply American
rules on the gold clause to such contracts. The analogous situation exists
with regard to contracts in "francs-or," widely used in Eastern Mediter-
ranean countries.76 If the parties to a contract agree upon a gold clause
it is because they wish the debt to be independent of unexpected vicis-
situdes of the contractual currency. Therefore, as soon as the gold
clause is incorporated into a contract the question of currency becomes
secondary. Thus the Supreme Court of Denmark duly held English
law not applicable to the gold clause of a contract made between a Nor-
wegian shipping company and a Danish dockyard for payment, in Copen-
hagen, of English pounds "in gold."" This happened after the English
Court of Appeal, but before the House of Lords, had passed on the ques-
tion in the Feist case. Therefore, the Danish Court was confronted with
a rule setting aside gold coin clauses.78
The theory that in respect to the validity or non-validity of the gold
clauses the "Wahrungsstatut" should control seems to be so objection-
able that the judgment of the Permanent Court is probably to be given
the other interpretation, namely that the law of the place of payment
must decide.70 That the law of the "place of performance" determines
76. Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 571. In Germany, too, numerous contracts between
residents have been made in "gold dollars." Wolff, INTh.NATIONALES PRIVATRECUT (1933)
101 admits that these contracts are not subject to the Joint Resolution. See, however,
infra note 134.
77. Judgment of June 21, 1933, 7 Zmcxsan FUR AusLANDisCnEs UND INTERNATIOUALIZ
PRIVATRECHr 960. The decision rests on the opinion of the English Court of Appeal,
making the gold clause inoperative, supra note 3.
78. See note 13, supra, and accompanying text. Contra: Supreme Court of Austria,
judgment dated March 12, 1930, (1930) DrE RECHTSPPCIHUNc 105. An Austrian property
owner mortgaged his estate to a German life insurance company for a debt expresed in
gold marks. The liability of the owner was, since connected with Austrian real estate
and contracted in Vienna, clearly governed by Austrian law. The court, however, held the
gold clause vitiated by the German ordinance of Sept. 28, 1914, which is construed as re-
ferring only to gold coin clauses. See note 68, supra. This opinion, however, was auxiliary-
the decision rests primarily on different grounds. In Modiano v. Bailey, 50 T. L. R. 43
(Ch. D. 1930), the following peculiar gold dollar clause was embodied in a bill of lading
issued by a Norwegian shipowner: "Freight collect on basis of pound Sterling equal to
$4.86 U. S. gold: shipowners to have option of collecting U. S. dollars or their own country's
currency at ruling rate of exchange for U. S. gold dollars." Application of American law
was not pleaded.
79. A recent Polish ordinance (June 12th, July 7th, No. 59,509) has provided that
validity of all gold clauses litigated in Polish courts shall depend upon the "Wihrungsstatut."
Ziffer, Die polnische Verordnung iiber die Erfiillng von Valutaverpflichtungett (1934)
Mrrr-TuNMN DES VERDAND S OSTmRC1xSCHER BANKxEr UND BAN=Rrs 254. Probably
the Polish authorities were influenced by an interpretation of this decision of the Perma-
nent Court contrary to that reached by the writer.
[Vol. 44
GOLD CLAUSE ABROGATION
the manner of performance, and, especially, the medium of payment in
which the promise to pay money is to be performed 60 is a well settled
rule of law not confined to the United States."' But this rule does not
apply here at all. Whether the payment may be made in gold coins
or in silver coins or in notes, that relates indeed to the manner or the
"medium" of payment.8" This, however, was not the point in the Serbian
and Brazilian cases. The Permanent Court did not construe the ex-
pression "franc-or" as a gold coin clause, but exclusively as a gold value
clause. It held the Serbian and Brazilian governments liable to pay
the bondholders, in the local currency of the contractual place of pay-
ment chosen by the bondholder, a sum equivalent to the value of the
gold coins corresponding to the amount of "francs-or" mentioned in the
bonds.8 3 Here is no longer the question of the "manner of payment," but
clearly of the "substance of the debt," as the amount of the debt is, of
course, an essential element of the debt. Therefore, owing to the dis-
tinction made by the court, Serbian law should have been decisive in
respect to the validity of the gold clause.
But even though the place of payment doctrine be accepted, the theory
of the case still raises grave difficulties. It is not made clear by the
court why Paris should be the place of payment. One may, consider-
ing the text of the bonds given above, eliminate Berlin and Vienna, as
the text fixes principal and interest neither in German nor in Austrian
currency; but at least Paris, Brussels and Geneva are coordinated as
places of payment." In Geneva, too, the payment "must or may" be
made, at the option of the bondholder, in "francs-or." Why not apply
Swiss law? No reason for answering in the negative is apparent unless
it may be that the bondholders asked for payment in Paris and that the
court was influenced by that fact; but it is not even alleged in the
court's very general argument, that the bondholders did ask for pay-
ment in Paris.
80. REsTATmaXET, CONiucT or LAWs (Final Draft No. 2, 1931) §§ 391, 353 (f).
31. See Loax=zEN, CAsEs oN CoNmcr or LAws (3d ed. 1932) 388, n. 18, referring to
French, German, Italian and Brazian law. For instance the German CoDo or Coizu.r,
paragraph 361, reads: "Measures, weights, currency, computation of time and of dlstanc ,
as used in the place of performance, must, in case of doubt, be conidered contractual."
82. REswEr.m-, Coerm~cr or LAWS (Treatise accompanying Tent. Draft No. 4, 192G)
35, refers "to the nature of currency by which obligation may be met," quoting Benners
v. Clemens, 58 Pa. 24 (1868); Grunwald v. Freese, 1 Okla. 366, 34 Pac. 73 (1893); Corn-
stock v. Smith, 20 Mlich. 338 (1870). The ruling of these cases is that a contract made
payable in a foreign country is supposed to contemplate a payment in the currency of
this country. That does not, of course, concern the question disccuased by the Permanent
Court and by our text.
83. (1929) JoupN. DR. INr. 1008.




Nevertheless the Permanent Court's decision, which has received wide
consideration, 5 has been cited for the proposition that the controlling
"place of payment" is the one in which payment is demanded. The
City of Vienna issued in 1922, for a loan received, bonds of the follow-
ing type: "500 crowns = 425 marks payable in Berlin = 525 francs
payable in Paris, Brussels or Basle = 100 U. S. A. gold dollars payable
in New York." By an Austrian statute of January 27, 1922, the city
of Vienna was authorized to discharge the bonds by paying the bond-
holder, in Austrian crowns, the amount of Austrian currency as stated
in the bonds. The effect was to deprive the bondholders of their rights,
as the Austrian crown had depreciated nearly to zero. A bondholder
brought, in the Berlin court, a suit against Vienna for payment, in
Zurich, of the full amount in Swiss francs, as indicated in the bonds.
The German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) held for the claimant.8
Quoting and joining the opinion of the Permanent Court, the Reichs-
gericht pointed out that the loan of an Austrian city is governed by Aus-
trian law, but that Swiss law alone must answer the question whether or
not Swiss francs have to be paid in Zurich, chosen as place of perfor-
mance by the bondholder. In this way the Austrian law, theoretically
acknowledged to be fundamental, was practically eliminated.
In our opinion, the validity of the gold clause must be considered to
rest on the legal system which, in general, determines the validity or
non-validity of the contract. This choice of law can be made only by
application of the rules of the "lex fori." So far, an inclusive solution
seems impossible. However, the problem itself, the methods of approach,
and the uncertainty of law, are everywhere almost the same. Thus, per-
tinent discussion of the subject made with reference to one country may
be found to be useful in other countries too.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws decides in favor of the law in
force at the place of contracting.87 But it is set forth in the commen-
taries to the Restatement that this rule has, until now, won little au-
thority. The opinion laid down by Lord Mansfield that the validity of
a contract is governed by the law intended by the parties-or, in the
language of Dicey, by the "proper law of the contract"-has not only
prevailed in England but has been adopted in more American states
than any other view. 8 It is well known, furthermore, that the reasons
85. It had been quoted by the House of Lords in the Feist case (for the construction
of the typical gold clause as a gold value clause), by the Swiss Federal Court in the
Heraclea case, by the United States Federal District Court in the Missouri Pacific case, and
by the Tribunal Civil Mixte of Alexandria in the judgment, infra note 126.
86. Judgment dated November 14, 1929, 126 Entscheidungen des Relchsgerichts In
Zivilsachen 196.
87. REsTATEIENT, Cosmer or LAWS § 332(d).
88. RESTATEENT, CoNirmcr oF LAWS (Treatise accompanying Tent. Draft No. 4, 1928)
21 et seq. See further, GoonsicE, Coscrrer oF LAws (1927) 228.
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advanced by Beale, the reporter of the Restatement," and by the Com-
mentaries to the Restatement, are vividly criticized by outstanding
writers like Lorenzen,9" and they are discordant with foreign decisions
based on principles similar to the American doctrine of Conflict of
Laws. 1 For the problem before us, the solution offered by Beale and
by the Restatement is unsatisfactory in any case. Suppose that we are
concerned with a bond loan wholly phrased in the well-known type of
American bonds, stated in terms of gold dollars, referring everywhere
to American law and custom, payable in the United States, quoted on
the New York Stock Exchange, placed among American capitalists;
if it is executed or even merely delivered abroad,12 the American legal
system as a whole would be quite inoperative with regard to the validity
of the bond. Were the bond (debenture) delivered abroad, but the under-
lying contract between the debtor and the financing American banker
(indenture) executed in the United States, -2a or vice versa, these dual
instruments, although very closely connected and, as a matter of course,
literally adapted to each other, would be governed by different legal sys-
tems. The customary clause:
"This agreement shall be deemed to be a New York contract and all rights
arising thereunder shall be interpreted and performance thereof shall be gov-
erned in accordance with the laws of the State of New York in the United
States of America93 and enforced accordingly"
would not change the situation, since the Restatement, neglecting the
needs and the results of practice,94 attempts by theoretical bias to exclude
any consideration of an agreement designing the system of law applic-
able. It is not possible within the scope of this article to explain the
89. (1909) 23 H]nv. L. Rav. 1, 79, 194, 260.
90. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921)
30 YAlE L. J. 565, 655, (1921) 31 YALE L. 3. 53; McClintock, Conflict of Laws as to
Contracts: Minnesota Decisions (1926) 10 Alm-N. L. Rav. 498; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases (1932) 10 Tx. L. Rmv. 163.
91. Compare for instance Dic=r, Co,,rucr or LAws (Keith, 5th ed. 1932) 95S et seq.;
for German and Swiss law, see NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 62, at 237 et seq.; and,
giving a general survey, FIC=, 4 REcE SVERGLrc Jrc DS 1%,WDw6rTEl r'cH rLR ims
Z m- uND HAuamrJsx (ed. by Schlegelberger) 364.
92. See RESTATmxET, CoN-cr or LAWS § 312: "Except as stated in § 313, vhen a
formal contract becomes effective on delivery, the place of contracting is where the
delivery is made."
92a See REsTATEm=, CoN-uLicT or LAws § 325: "In the case of an informal bilateral
contract, the place of contracting is where the second promise is made in consideration of
the first promise."
93. That the laws of the United States form part of the law of the State of New York
is naturally implied. So the Hague court stated in the Royal Dutch case, infra note 104.
94. Express agreements on the law applicable are customary in international contracts,
and from a practical view not objectionable at all.
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principles which, in our opinion, should be followed in choosing the
law determining the validity or non-validity of a promise. What
seems to us impossible, in any event, is the elimination, in this ques-
tion, of the legal system of the territory which is mainly connected with
the promise (or contract). If, under this system, the contract is wholly
or partly vitiated, this fact must be respected by the "lex fori," i.e. by
the court of every foreign jurisdiction. Therefore each gold dollar bond
which, considered as a whole, must be considered American, 0 is af-
fected by the Joint Resolution. The same is true for a debt secured
by a mortgage on American real estate, provided the mortgage was a
major condition of the credit.
In determining with what state the contract is mainly connected, par-
ticular consideration must be given to the place of payment. The im-
portance of that place has, on the authority of Savigny, been widely
exaggerated in Central European practice,9 and the same trend has,
through Story,98 influenced the development of American law. But for
bonds, notes, and negotiable instruments (not for obligations arising
out of sales, leases, contracts for work, partnerships and other bilateral
contracts), the place of payment offers indeed the most visible "point
de rattachement," and this corresponds with the general view in busi-
ness which lays stress upon this element of the promise. Therefore,
the law of the place of payment must most often be considered the law
governing the promise, and consequently, its validity. So we approach
somewhat the doctrine of the Permanent Court. Notwithstanding, con-
siderable divergence remains. The bearing of the territorial relationship
created by the place of performance depends upon the special circum-
stances of the case. If there are several alternative places of payment sit-
uated in different countries, they can not govern the choice of law.
Nor can the exercise of the option by the bondholder be held decisive,
as supposed by the Reichsgericht. Strengthening the discretionary power
of the bondholder to such an extent would unduly burden the debtor,
and split up the homogeneous loan into an indefinitely changing variety
of pieces governed by different laws. And what law should govern, so
long as the bondholder has not exercised the option? It is impossible
to have a contract legally "in vacuo" and it is not less unsatisfactory
to have the legal system applicable prior to the exercise of the option
suddenly supplanted by another in consequence of the bondholder's
95. I attempted to do so in NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 62, at 236 et seq., 244
et seq.
96. See the phrase "This agreement shall be deemed to be a New York contract" in
the clause mentioned above.
97. See NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 62, at 217 et seq.
98. See STORY, CoFLaIcT OF LAws § 280.
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decision. After all, in the case of the Serbian loan, we believe Serbian
law applicable, all the more since Belgrade was the place of contract
as well as one of the places of performance.
We must, however, distinguish between the place of "payment" and
the place of "collection." This is shown by the customary clause dis-
cussed by the Hague courtain the Royal Dutch case, and worded as
follows:
"At the option of the bearer, the Company is bound ... to pay to the
bearer hereof ... in the Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York,
U. S. A., 1000L in gold coin of the U. S. A. of or equal to the standard of
weight and fineness as it existed on April 1, 1930....
"At the option of the bearer . .. the principal of and interest on this de-
benture shall be collectible as provided below at any of the following optional
places of collection: in the City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, . . . in
Dutch guilders; in the City of London, England, . . . in pounds Sterling; in
the cities of Basle or Zurich,... in Swiss francs; or, in the City of Stockholm,...
in Swedish kronor; in each case, at the buying rate in such optional place of
collection for sight exchange on New York on the date of presentation of this
debenture and/or the coupons appertaining hereto."
In this case, New York is the place of payment; Amsterdam, London,
Basle, Zurich, Stockholm are places of collection. The very careful
phrasing of the bond, the whole text of which cannot be reproduced
here,99 makes it clear that "payment" and "collection" express different
concepts. Obviously, the rules relating to the place of payment should
be exclusively applied to New York. The expression of this intention
cannot be considered to be a playing with words. As a matter of fact,
the debt's connection with New York is the major one; not only the
fiscal agent intrusted with the service of the loan is located here, but
American currency is basic for the loan, and the amounts to be paid, in
local currency, in Amsterdam, London, Basle, Zurich, Stockholm, are
determined by the exchange rate on New York0 0 The place of pay-
ment is a necessary element of the debt, and in case it is not specified
by the parties, it must be determined by construction; places of collec-
tion are added simply as facilities to the bondholders. 01 Similar dis-
99. It is to be found in Weekblad van Het Recht, March 8, 1934, No. 12719.
100. There is no "option de change," but only "option de place." The "option de
change" would require that the amounts to be paid in one of the optional currencias
should be fixed by the bond in advance as independent of each other. An example is
offered by the Vienna investment loan, supra page 70. On the "option de change" and
"option de place" there is an abundance of decisions. See NussAxcmr, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 70 et seq.
101. In the same sense, Appellate Court [Hof] of Amsterdam in the case of the loan
of Compagnie Internationale des Wagonlits et des Grands Express Europ:-e.L% judgment
of Dec. 11, 1929, Weekblad van Het Recht No. 12121 (1930). Brussels being the domicile
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tinctions are made by foreign laws. Thus German law contrasts "Er-
fiillungsort" or-with regard to debts-"Zahlungsort" ("place of per-
formance" and "place of payment") and "Bestimmungsort" ("place of
destination"), the rule being that in case of doubt the debtor has to
pay at his domicile ("Zahlungsort") but nevertheless to send the money,
at the creditor's cost and risk, to the latter's residence.1 0 2  And French
decisions distinguish between "lieu de paiement" and "lieu de versement,"
the former being the only place where the payment must be made, the
latter being, on special agreement, in the option of the debtor. 0 3 Gen-
erally speaking, then, the place of payment is not always identical with
the place in which the creditor actually receives the money. In the
matter of gold clauses, major importance, if any, should be attributed
only to the place of payment.
Several recent decisions illustrate an accurate use of the proper rules of
the Conflict of Laws. The Hague court of first resort recently held, in
the cases of the Royal Dutch Shell and the Batavia Petroleum Com-
pany,"0 4 both involving gold loans issued in the United States, that Amer-
ican law was applicable, on the ground that the standard clause ex-
pressing intent to be governed by American law15 was embodied in the
bonds. Even putting aside this clause, the applicability of American law
could not be doubted, as the bonds were in every respect adapted to
American law and custom, particularly stating New York as place of
payment. 08 The proper theory was set forth also by the Supreme Court
of Austria in a decision dated February 12, 1929. An Austrian insurance
company in 1906 made an insurance contract with an Austrian resident in
terms of German gold marks payable in Vienna. After the war the
company tried to avail itself of the German ordinance of September 28,
1914.07 The court held that the defense was not good, and that the debt
was exclusively governed by Austrian law, the closest connections of the
contract evidently leading to Austria.0 Unfortunately, the court, to the
of the company and the place of payment, Belgian law was held exclusively applicable
although there were facilities for collection in Cologne, Amsterdam, London and Parig,
The same loan came before the French Cour de Cassation, judgment of December 6, 1933,
Gazette du Palais 1934 I. 298; the adjudication was similar.
102. GERMAN Civ¢ CoDE, par. 269, I (2) and par. 270, IV; see NussmAum, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 74 et seq.
103. Cf. Perroud (1924) JouRN. DR. INT. 635, n. 28, and decisions quoted there.
104. Judgments dated February 15, 1934, Weekblad van Het Recht, March 8, 1934,
No. 12719.
105. For the wording of this clause see notes 93, 94, supra, and accompanying text.
106. In the Royal Dutch case, however, the court by misapprehension of the meaning
of the Joint Resolution, held that the loan did not come within its terms. See note 143,
infra and accompanying text.
107. NuSSBAUm, op. cit. supra note 35, at 84.
108. (1929) DrE RECHTSPRECHUNG 107.
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prejudice of a German company, later abandoned this view."" A correct
decision was given furthermore by the court of Copenhagen in the case
of Soderberg v. Telephone Company of Copenhagen,""' where the joint
Resolution was applied. Since a loan of the company was exclusively
placed in the United States, and since principal and interest were payable
only in American dollars in New York, at the Guaranty Trust Company,
as fiscal agent, evidently the court concluded from these facts that the
loan as a whole was governed by American law.
"Ordre Public"
Suppose American law were held to govern the contract according to
the rules of "lex fori." The further question arises whether or not the
application of the joint Resolution will be refused on the ground that it
violates the "ordre public" (public policy) of the country in which en-
forcement is sought. It is well known that in continental systems of
private international law the notion of "ordre public" can everywhere
check the application of foreign law. It gives the courts a large dis-
cretion, enabling the judge to refuse the application of any foreign pro-
vision considered harmful to fundamental domestic interests; and it is
possible for the judge to use this discretion to refuse enforcement to a
foreign statute abrogating or restricting the gold clause. But in practice
the courts seem to be cautious; indeed they are rather reluctant to
make use of the "ordre public" concept. In the case of the Vienna
investment loan the Berlin Appellate Court (Kammergericht) pointed
out that the application of the Austrian statute of January 27, 1922, would
be injurious to German public policy."1 The fact that gold clauses had
been abrogated by German law too, was not mentioned in the opinion
of the court. Nevertheless, the argument was clear and consistent in
itself, for in the field of "ordre public" the judge has to take care only of
domestic interests. On appeal, however, the German Supreme Court
(Reichsgericht) reached the same conclusion by application of the place
of payment theory,"- evading, obviously on purpose, the "ordre public"
issue. An allegation that German "ordre public" had been violated
might have been felt by the Reichsgericht to be hypocritical or an un-
friendly act toward Austria.
We know of no cases in any other court than the Berlin Kammergericht
expressly declining the application of a foreign gold clause statute for
reasons of public policy.113 There are, however, several which seem to
109. Supra note 78.
110. Not yet published.
111. Judgment of July 2, 1928, 28 Bankarchiv 27.
112. See note 86, supra, and accompanying text.
113. Cf. judgment of the Berlin Appellate Court (Kammergericht) of December 28,
1922, (1923) JuRT-cIaS WocnE~scnnnET 128, concerning a Polish ordinance. The
situation was a very special one. Cf. NUSSBAUMS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 162.
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rest tacitly on that ground. In a case before the Tribunal Civil de la
Seine, an Italian railroad company was sued for payment of "gold-lire"
bonds issued by the company. The defendant set up an Italian ordi-
nance enabling certain Italian companies to discharge their gold bonds
by paying the face value of the bonds in lire plus an additional amount
of 25 per cent, although the lire had kept only about 25 per cent of parity.
The court held that the defense was not good, the ordinance not being
applicable; but the court gave no reason for this decision.114  A Polish
monetary ordinance dated March 19, 1924, was involved in the case of
the Socifti des Charbonnages de Sosnowice, decided by the Appellate
Court of Paris."15 The ordinance invoked by the defendant had reduced
the obligations issued by Polish companies and expressed in foreign
currency, to one-third in value. In this case likewise, the court, without
giving further explanation, held that the ordinance was not applicable.
So far European courts have evinced no inclination to apply the con-
cept of "ordre public" to defeat the application of the American Joint
Resolution. Although some foreign writers have attacked this statute
as violative of the fundamental international rule of "pacta sunt servanda"
and have urged that any defense derived from the Resolution be re-
jected, 116 nevertheless the Hague, 104 the Vienna, 1" 7 and the Copen-
hagen"10 courts of first resort, which alone have had occasion to deal
with the question,"" have all declined to hold the American statute
contrary to domestic policy. The Hague court says:
"There cannot be any question about violation of public order, as the
measure [the Joint Resolution] has, according to its purpose set forth in the
preamble, been enacted, as required by urgent necessity and public [American]
interest, and not at all-here the claimant himself agrees-in order to injure
the creditors."' 04
114. Sodt6 Italienne de Chemins de Fer Mridionaux, January 18, 1928, Gazette du
Palais, 1928 I. 815.
115. Decision of April 19, 4928, Cour de Paris (ire Ch.), (1928) JouRN. DR. INT. 695.
116. Thus Shatzky, Repudiation de la Clause Dollar Or par les Etats Unis (1933)
Joum. DR. INT. 539; CoRDEs, 33 BANxAcmHv 348; similar arguments are set forth by
PASCHIG, MI EILUNGEN DES VERBANDES OSTERREICHIScuER BANxEN UND B1AN1XZs (1933)
180, who refers particularly to § 37 of the Austrian Civil Code, which submits contracts
made outside of Austria between an Austrian and non-Austrian, to Austrian law, provided
that the parties of the contract did not obviously intend to take as a basis another law.
This intention, however, is invariably to be found in the cases here described. Besides
that, there exists in Austria special statutes taking precedence over the general regulations
of the Civil Code. See note 47, supra.
117. Judgment of the Bezirksgericht, Innere Stadt Wien, March 1, 1934, (1934) Dia
REC SPRECH UNG 82.
118. The German Appellate Court of Cologne, too, dealing with the gold dollar bonds
of the Vereinigte Stahwerke shortly expressed the opinion that some series of the bonds
are deprived of their gold clauses by the Joint Resolution as informally reported by the
Berliner Tageblatt of July 16, 1934, No. 331.
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This appreciation by the Hague court of the Joint Resolution is the
more important, as Holland is one of the few countries which have not
restricted gold clauses at all. For courts of other countries, it is evi-
dently still more difficult to take another attitude." The reasoning of
the German Reichsgericht in the Vienna investment loan case proves
this; 120 and the Vienna court, contending that Austrian "ordre public" was
not involved, rests its opinion expressly on the fact that Austrian law
likewise had restricted gold clauses.117
Yet these three courts have not even proposed the argument which
may be considered strongest for recognizing the Joint Resolution in
international relationships. It consists in the fact that the American
legislature has consciously extended the effects of the Joint Resolution
to non-American debtors obligated in gold to American creditors. Secre-
tary of the Treasury William H. Woodin delivered, after the House
and Senate committees had favorably reported on the Resolution, the
following explanation of it:
"Internationally, adoption of the resolution might mean a reduction of more
than $2,500,000,000, in terms of foreign currencies, in debts owed to the
American Government and American business by foreign debtors. There would
not be a commensurate loss to the American creditors unless they wished to
use the repaid funds internationally.
"Treasury and Commerce Department figures show that this reduction would
result because payments from abroad on private or governmental debts need
no longer be made in gold. Dollars of any type, which have been selling at a
discount of at least 10 per cent in terms of foreign monies, could be purchased
and used to discharge the debt. Since the governmental debts owed America
total more than $11,000,000,000, and the long term investments of .mericans
abroad amount to more than $15,000,000,000, the reduction in terms of foreign
currencies as long as the dollar continues to sell at a discount of 10 per cent
could aggregate about $2,500,000,000. -121
And in the House hearings of May 29, Representative McFadden of
Pennsylvania stated:
"This repudiation bill was framed and brought here in the interests of the
foreign debtors of the United States. Its aim is a cancellation of war debts by
fraud and treachery toward the American people. It gives the foreign nations
119. I do not say impossible, since, as mentioned before, only domestic interests are
controlling in this question.
120. CoRuEs, op. cit. supra note 116, at 351, declares that the German ordinance of
1914, which is still in force and will of course remain so, is "transitory'." He further-
more does not mention that the Reichsgericht, by means of par. 245 of the GunsLu- Cn-rL
CoDE, and by means of interpretation, has made the gold clause practically inopzrative,
as shown in the text above note 12, supra. So he reaches the conclusion that it would 12
wrong to put German and American law on the same level.
121. U. S. News, May 20-27, 1933, p. 3, col. 2.
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a way of making entirely fictitious payments of the war debts. It permits
them to use the Federal Reserve currency and United States credit which was
unlawfully taken by the Federal Reserve Board and exploited abroad. The
United States Treasury has been drawn upon by the Federal Reserve Board for
paper money and for credit exchangeable for money, and these, unlawfully
taken, have been sent to the debtor nations.'1 22
These assertions are, of course, somewhat askew. It must be appreci-
ated, however, that the American statute requires, in a sense of fairness
and at American cost, a thoroughly equal treatment of non-American
debtors as well as creditors. It would have been a fairly shrewd stroke
of business for the United States to exclude from the benefits of the act,
according to the French doctrine, contracts involving "international
payments." Such an exception would have brought in a profit to the
United States similar to or greater than that taken by France. Further-
more, in view of the ambiguity of the concepts, "international payment"
and "international contract," the American ruling must be preferred
from the standpoint of international equity.
Nevertheless, the French courts are likely to decline the application
of the Joint Resolution. The Tribunal Civil de la Seine recently laid
down, in Boncompagne v. Credit Foncier Egyptien,123 an opinion which
seems noteworthy. The Credit Foncier Egyptien had issued, before the
war, bonds payable in gold at Paris, London, Brussels, Geneva and in
Egypt. The bank refused to pay the gold value, as a decree of the
Khedive, dated August 2, 1914,124 had abrogated the gold clause. The
court held for the claimants (bondholders):
"Considering that the 'cours forc' measure taken for reasons of national
interest is limited to the territory of the nation having established it and does
not run with the securities circulating abroad;
"Considering the defendant cannot take advantage of the 'cours forc6' (le
cours forc6 n'est pas opposable) in the matter of international payment;
"Considering that in the case at bar an international payment is involved." 1 4
By "cours forc" it is meant that: (1) bank notes are legal tender
(that they have "cours legal"); and (2) that those bank notes can-
not be converted into gold. The idea seems to be that under these cir-
cumstanc.es the notes must be accepted by creditors only within the
territory of the state concerned. French doctrine presupposes that the
abrogation of the gold clause forms part of the "cours force." It was
from these premises that the conclusion was drawn that the abrogation
of the gold clause by French law could not be referred to "international
122. 78 CONG. REc. 4538 (1934). Similar viewpoints were advanced by Representativc
Beedy, id. at 4542.
123. May 31, 1933 (1934) Jou-'. DR. IxT. 368.
124. See note 36, supra.
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payments."' 25 Now the Tribunal Civil de la Seine applies the same order
of ideas to foreign-in this case to Egyptian-monetary law. The
theoretical basis is not made quite clear. Does the court interpret the
Egyptian statute as meaning that only domestic payments are to be
affected by it, or does the court intend to lay down a rule of French
private international law, according to which French "ordre public" pre-
vents the application by French courts of foreign laws introducing the
"cours forc6," with its supposed concomitant gold clause abrogation? By
the second alternative, only French interests would be protected; whereas
the first alternative would lead to the result that the foreign gold clause
statute would be considered ineffective in any case of international pay-
ment, that is to say, even if French interests were not concerned. The
writer does not think that this construction is contemplated by the
court, which argues apparently on the ground of French law." °
The French doctrine is very unsatisfactory and has been criticized by
outstanding French writers. -7 It is misleading to say that the "cours
forc6," as opposed to the "cours 16gal," is limited to national boundaries.
The "cours l6gal," to wit, the attribution to certain pieces of paper of the
quality of legal tender, ends indeed at the frontiers of the state. Only
within this territory must creditors accept these papers as payment at
face value, whether the papers be convertible or not. However, the fact
that the notes are legal tender (the "cours 16gal") has nothing to do
with the validity or invalidity of the gold clause in any case.l -s More-
over, the question of convertibility concerns only the relationship between
the holder of the paper, domestic or foreign, and the issuing bank. Hence
125. See notes 51, 52, supra, and accompanying text.
126. The Tribunal Civi of Cairo, court of first resort, has held by a judgment of
June 5, 1933, in Sursock v. Cr~dit Foncier Egyptien, that the Egyptian laws on "cours
forcP"-the court had in mind the decree of August 2, 1914-do not cover international
payments. (1933) JOURq. DR ITr. 1060. This would favor the firt alternative. But
the decision of the Cairo Tribunal was issued later than the French, and its argument
is very disputable. The Tribunal Civil of Alexandria, in Levy & Paquier v. Land Bank
of Egypt, January 11, 1934, (1934) JoauRN. DR. L-'r. 705 construing the same dece
goes even further. It seems to assume the theory that no national legislature i3 able to
reach contracts involving an "international character." A gold obligation contracted in
1918 between Russians in the Ukraine, contrary to Bolshevik law, was held valid by
the Tribunal Civil de la Seine, Jan. 1, 1930, Gazette du PalaL, 1930 I. 48S, on the ground
that under the rule of the "white-guardist" General Denikin, old Russian law not derogat-
ing the gold clauses had to apply. In the field of international private law there are
probably few cases applying law emanating from that general.
127. I quote only Nogaro, (1925) REv TRmasmxr=LE DE Dnorr CvI P9v S et
seq.; Niboyet, (1925) RxvuE DR. L'zr. Pi E, 161; , frsTRn and JEs, L, CLvsE-.0 =a
Daorr FRA _qAms (1926) 91 et seq.; Rivilre, (1932) RLv u DR. L "v. Pnxv- 1. The writer ex-
posed the counterarguments in NussBAuai, op. it. supra note 35, at 17 et seq.
128. In the Feist ca e, however, the Court of Appeal advanced the opposite vievwoint.
See (1933) Ch. D. 684, at 705 (Lord Lawrence) and 710 (Lord Romer).
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the fact that the paper is inconvertible is a fact which is equally true
as to parties outside the territorial limits within which a legal tender
law is by its nature confined. Besides, it is not true that the invalidity
of the gold clause is a part or a necessary consequence of the "cours
force," that is to say, a necessary consequence of giving inconvertible
paper money the status of legal tender.12 The experience of the United
States during the sixties and of England during contemporary times pro-
vides such striking counter evidence to such an assertion, that any theor-
etical reasoning on this score may be disregarded. Notwithstanding, I
presume it is probable that the French courts will apply to the American
statute the rule laid down by the Tribunal Civil de la Seine if the question
should arise.5 0 The Belgian and Egyptian jurisdictions are likely to do
the same.1"1
The sharpest weapon against the abrogation of the gold clause would
be retaliation. This is, in general, possible only by virtue of special
laws allowing such retaliation. Thus the Austrian decree on the pay-
ment of foreign gold and silver debts, dated June 14, 192 1,132 permits the
debtor, when residing in Austria, to avail himself of foreign laws restrict-
ing gold clauses, provided that the creditor is residing or was residing, at
the time the contract was made, in the state which restricted the clauses,
or that the contract was made or must be performed in that state. Under
this decree, the debtor can oppose the abrogation of the gold clause, for
instance, against an American creditor, even if American law is not in
question and the debt is governed by another law upholding the clause.
As a matter of fact, such a case does not seem to have occurred up to
the present. But in the case of the Austrian Federal Loan of 1930,
mentioned above, the Vienna court dismissed the bondholders' claim on
129. In Germany the "cours forci" of the banknotes was enacted by a law of Aug.
4, 1914; the abrogation of the gold clause, as indicated above, by decree of Sept. 28. 1914.
The German mark was then still at par, see judgment of Oct. 13, 1933, 142 Entscheidunen
des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 70, 80.
130. In the case of Travellers Bank v. Paten6tre, Oct. 26, 1933, Gazette du Palals, 1933
II. 877 the defense of the Bank derived from the Joint Resolution was held not to be good
for the reason that the case was not governed at all by American law.
131. The Supreme Court of Denmark says, in the judgment cited supra note 77, that
in international relationships there is particular reason for upholding the gold clause,
regardless of any restrictions being in force, for national considerations in the country In
whose currency or in whose territory the debt is payable. The reasoning, however, doex
not rest upon the French theory, as the Danish court upholds domestic gold clauses too.
Judgment of October 6, 1933, 7 Zarrscmur zU AusLXNDzscnaS UND INTERNMAIONALS
PPRVATRECHT 962. In the case of the Copenhagen Telephone Co., not yet reported, the
court of first instance admitted the application of the Joint Resolution.
132. See NusSBAUXr, op. cit. supra note 35, at 88.
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the ground of the retaliatory decree of June 14, 19 2 1.1" In Hungary a
similar provision has been adopted.1 34
Limitations Imposed by Wording of the Joint Resolution
In delineating the sphere within which the Joint Resolution operates,
we come finally to the question of how far the phrasing of the Resolu-
tion restricts its own applicability. Although foreign courts have shown
themselves reluctant to vitiate either the American or other gold clause
abrogation statutes by the use of the "ordre public" argument, they
nevertheless seem to favor giving a restrictive construction to the Joint
Resolution. Thus its non-application is achieved without attacking
American law; nay, in ostensible conformity with it. Such argumenta-
tion obviously offers psychological and diplomatic advantages.23
Restrictive interpretations have taken various forms. Some European
writers have expressed doubts as to whether the Resolution concerns
foreign debtors at all. 3 That these doubts are completely unfounded
is proved by the law itself, which does not distinguish between foreign
and domestic debtors at all, as well as by the intentions of Congress,
made clear by the statement of Secretary of the Treasury Woodin and
by Congressional hearings.'37 It has also been asserted that the Resolu-
tion does not apply to foreign creditors unless they reside in the United
States; but in the Copenhagen Telephone Company case, the Copenhagen
court rejected this contention as unsound.' 38 Greater weight, however,
must be accorded to the proposition that the law embraces only debts
made primarily payable within the United States and does not govern
debts made primarily payable outside the territory of the United
States (as distinguished from debts made merely collectible in some
foreign country). This construction was advanced particularly by the
Hague court in the Royal Dutch and Batavia cases.1a9 The court empha-
133. See note 63 and accompanying text.
134. Decree of February 10, 1923, par. 4. See NussB.tuzx, op. cit. supra note 35, at 93.
The recent Polish ordinance, cited supra note 79, operates somewhat as a retaliatory measure.
Wolff, Internationales Privatrecit, in 15 Enzo:PADI DER RrcnTs t.D Sr %Txsv:usE:;-
scmsArr 57, advances the opinion, that in the case of an American creditor and a German
debtor, the contract being governed by German law, the debtor neverthele s could a-ail
himself of the Joint Resolution, provided that the debt be payable in the United States.
That would be a retaliation for which, in default of a pertinent governmental decree
(see Art. 30 of the Introductory Law to the GR=N Car. CoDE), there is no basis in
German law. See NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 62, at 78.
135. It may also involve better chances for recognition of foreign judgments by Ameriman
courts; see infra note 148.
136. Thus WABRLE, DiE REcmsPREcium o (1934) 85, reporting that the same view was
advanced by the review, DAs Gmu), March 4, 1934.
137. See notes 121, 122, supra.
138. Decision of frst instance, not yet reported.
139. Supra note 104. To the same effect, see CoRnas, op. cit. supra note 116, at 34S.
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sizes that the Joint Resolution, according to the preamble, rests upon the
consideration that "dealing in gold affects the public interest," and that
provisions for payment in gold "obstruct the power of the Congress to
maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar." But that refers
evidently, as explained before, to the literal performance of the gold
coin clause-that is, to the corporeal conveyance of gold. Such convey-
anc.e, to be sure, is clearly forbidden only within the territory of the
United States. But in the Royal Dutch and Batavia cases, gold value
clauses were involved, as acknowledged by the court; and such a debt
being payable in paper dollars, there is no reason why the arguments
advanced by the court should prevent the application of the law to debts
primarily payable outside the United States. The text of the Joint
Resolution itself does not provide any such limitation. For example,
there is no reason why a gold debt taken over by an American resident
against another American resident in New York and secured by a New
York mortgage, but for some special reason made payable primarily at
Toronto should not be governed by American law. However, since
American contracts made primarily payable in some foreign country are
almost always made payable (as distinguished from merely collectible)
in a foreign monetary unit, in which event the Joint Resolution is inap-
plicable,14 this particular question will not be of much importance,
unless, contrary to the views expressed in this article, the "Wiihrungs-
statut" (the law of the country in terms of the monetary unit of which
the parties have *contracted) 4' is held to govern the contract. 4 "
If the debt is payable in New York in dollars but collectible elsewhere
in local currency, the Joint Resolution should nevertheless be applicable.
In the Royal Dutch case, however, the Hague court of first resort took
the opposite view."°4 In that case, although American law was held to
govern the bond issue in suit, and although the only place of payment
expressly provided for in the bonds was New York, the bondholders
were allowed to escape the application of the Joint Resolution because
Amsterdam, which was specified in the bonds as a place of collection, had
been selected by the bondholders as the place for encashment. But in
140. See page 83, infra.
141. See notes 73-78, supra, and accompanying text. If the "Wfibrungsstatut" is held
decisive, gold dollar contracts between non-Americans, who are almost certain to make
the debt payable outside the United States, will be governed by the Joint Resolution unless
it is interpreted as not applying to debts payable abroad.
142. Also unless the place of collection chosen for encashment is erroneously regarded as
the place of payment and, under the place of payment theory, is considered as
controlling. See notes 99-103, supra, and accompanying text. In such case, con-
tracts entered into and made payable in some foreign country, but optionally collectible
in the United States, would be governed by the Joint Resolution unless it were restrictively
interpreted as not applying to debts payable abroad.
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the Batavia case, in which the bonds did not mention any place of col-
lection, the same court dismissed the suit on the ground of the Joint
Resolution. 4 This Solomonic decision is legally and economically un-
satisfactory. The fault lies with the court's failure to discriminate be-
tween place of payment and place of collection. 1 3
On the other hand, it follows from the text of the Joint Resolution
that only debts payable in American dollars are governed by it. Thus
if a contract governed in itself by American law provides for payment in
Canadian gold dollars, the Joint Resolution can not apply. And although
a payment in any gold coin within American territory would be legally
impossible under the President's orders, the creditor would be entitled to
receive in currency the full gold value of the amount contracted for.'"
These cases are likely to be so rare that the American legislature did not
consider them. If it is kept in mind that the application of the Joint
Resolution presupposes that the contract is governed by American law,
there should be no apprehension of an excessively extended effect, in
international cases, of the Joint Resolution.
Such questions of interpretation as do not bear upon territorial restric-
tions must be put aside in this article. Two of them, however, may be
mentioned as connected in fact chiefly with international business. A
Frenchman desired regular payments of about $120,000 quarterly from
America, and an American bank in 1932 guaranteed him, for a com-
mission of $15,000, a dollar rate of 25 francs, 32/2 being the then gold
par, for a two year period. After the Joint Resolution was passed, the
bank declined to carry out the agreement, but was held liable by the
Appellate Court of Paris.&4 The Court deemed American law not to be
applicable. But even apart from that, the case did not come within the
scope of the Joint Resolution. The bank's obligation did not "purport to
give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of
coin or currency or in an amount in money of the United States measured
thereby"; the amount to be paid was measured by foreign money-a
situation not covered by the Joint Resolution.
The application of the Joint Resolution, however, can not be excluded
by any waiver declared in advance by the debtor; for the recognition of
such a waiver would be incompatible with the spirit of the Joint Resolu-
143. See notes 99-103 supra, and accompanying text.
144. For the method of conversion into American dollars, in the case of an American
judgment, see Comstock v. Smith, 20 Mich. 333 (1870).
145. Travellers Bank v. Paten6tre et Banque de France, Oct. 26, 1933, Gazette du Paa-,
1933 II. 877. The joint Resolution is not expressly mentioned in the opinion, which refers
to "restrictive measures taken, with regard to banking business, by the President of the




tion, which grants relief to debtors for reasons of public policy. This
view must necessarily be adopted also by non-American courts provided
American law is applicable. The question is internationally important,
since many American gold dollar bonds issued by European debtors in
postwar times contain provisos by which the debtor abandons all defenses
resulting from any future emergency legislation affecting the creditor's
rights. In drafting such clauses the parties were thinking of possible
legislative measures proceeding from the debtor's country. Now that the
creditors are faced with nullificatory measures taken at home, it is no
doubt some consolation to them to reflect that a European court is
less likely to refuse to recognize waivers of benefits conferred by
American laws than waivers of benefits conferred by laws of their own
country.140
It is apparent from the discussion in the preceding sections that a
foreign court might sustain the gold clause, although according to Ameri-
can ruling the Joint Resolution should apply. In that event the creditor
might, on the strength of the judgment, seize any assets of the debtor situ-
ated within the state of jurisdiction. And the judgment might be given
effect also in other countries, following the territorial laws providing for
the recognition and execution of foreign judgments. Of course, if such
recognition and execution were applied for before an American court, the
claim surely would be dismissed; for even if the Court were not disposed
to utilize the concept of public policy,147 comity would not compel the
recognition of the foreign judgment, at least where American nationals
or residents were concerned.148  But there is no doubt that courts of third
states would give effect to the judgment provided the formal requirements
therefor were fulfilled. The concept of "ordre public" of the state in
which execution of the judgment is sought would not prevent the disre-
gard by the courts of that state of an American statute, at least where
American debtors are involved. Thus, the consequences of the judgment
might become dangerous to a debtor not possessing considerable assets
in the country where the original judgment is entered but having such
146. Waiver of the benefit of the Joint Resolution has been held valid by the Appellate
Court of Cologne in the decision cited note 118, supra.
147. See GooDaicn, HANDBOOx ON Tn'E CoNraCt or LAWS (1927) § 203, p. 465.
148. See the famous definition of comity given by Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U. S. 113, 164 (1895): "But it is the recognition which one nation allows within ltg
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." See also, Matter of James, 248
N. Y. 1, 161 N. E. 201 (1928). Non-application caused by misinterpretation of the statute
would probably not prevent recognition of the judgment. Godard v. Gray, L. R. 6Q. B. 139 (1870); MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Rr. Co., 71 N. H. 448, 52 Atl. 982 (1902);
RESTATEmENT, CoN ucr or LAWS (1932) §§ 445, 451.
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assets within the third state. The danger, however, is lessened by the
fact that the recognition of foreign judgments in most countries encoun-
ters generally the greatest difficulties, practically much greater than in
the United States, except in the rare cases where special treaties exist 40 0
Governmental Debts
Gold obligations of governments need special consideration. They
are of two kinds. The first type, which embraces governmental bonds
offered to public subscription and governmental debts resting on private
contracts, are governed by common law, or, in Continental terminology,
"private law." Here the state has not acted as sovereignY 0 The second
group is composed of obligations created by acts of sovereignty, chiefly
by treaties.
As regards the first group, the state stands on the same level as other
debtors and must have the same benefit of laws granting debtors relief
for reasons of emergency. Indeed, the financial condition of the state is
generally not less affected by a national crisis than that of the common
debtor. Of course, the statute restricting the gold clause may provide
special regulations with respect to governmental debts, but in default of
that, the general rule must apply to this group of obligations. The Joint
Resolution expressly includes "every obligation of and to the United
States, excepting currency." Thereby earlier contrary provisions are re-
pealed. It has been argued that devaluation of the debts of the United
States involves a particular derogation of the American Constitution,
namely of Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment ("The validity of
the public debt of the United States, authorized by law . . . shall not be
questioned.") This contention is advanced only by a single author 0 1
Again the writer would not like to enter too deeply into questions of
American constitutional interpretation. But it may be said that the pro-
vision forms part of the financial regulation adopted following the Civil
War and must be, apparently, considered in its connection with the whole
of this regulation. It does not seem to proclaim a principal of legal
philosophy, but to envisage a particular situation existing at the time of
its enactment (1866).
To the second group of governmental obligations-those created by
acts of sovereignty-belong the obligations taken over by the United
States in the Treaty of 1903 with the Republic of Panama, giving the
149. For a short survey, see NUSSBAum, op. cit. supra note 62, at 423 et seq.
150. See Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 445 (1877), and further decisons quoted
by King, supra note 2, at 149.
151. Eder, A Forgotten Section of The Fourteenth Amendment (1933) 19 Com.y. L. Q. 1.
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United States the control of the Panama Canal Zone (Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty).152 Article XIV of the Treaty provides:
"As the price or compensation for the rights, powers and privileges granted
in this convention by the Republic of Panama the Government of the United
States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars
($10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States on the exchange of the rati-
fication of this convention, and also an annual payment during the life of this
convention, of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), in like gold
coin, beginning nine years after the date aforesaid." 53
This contract rests exclusively on international law. It is not governed
by the law of the United States. Therefore, in my opinion, the Joint
Resolution cannot apply.'54 But the arguments of the Permanent Court in
the Serbian-Brazilian. Loan case 55 may justify a contrary decision. For
if the validity or non-validity of the gold clause depends upon the law of
the state in the monetary system of which the debt has been fixed, then
American law, as the "dollar law," must apply, even if the treaty as a
whole is governed by international law. Why we cannot follow the
opinion of the Permanent Court is set forth above.151
Public International Law
The validity or invalidity of the gold clause is in itself a matter of
private law, and to the extent that international relationships are con-
cerned, a matter of international private law. But public international
law too has sometimes been encroached upon by national measures
affecting the gold clause, by virtue of their extraordinary financial effects.
This is shown, to a certain extent, by the case of the Serbian and Bra-
zilian loans, where the controversy was submitted to the Permanent Court
of International Justice. The Court considered itself competent to take
cognizance of the case owing to the fact that the French government was
152. 33 STAT. 2234 (1903), 48 U. S. C. A. § 1301 (1926).
153. 33 STAT. 2238 (1903).
154. In the text of Art. XIV, after the term "dollars in gold coin of the United States,"
the customary words "of the present weight and fineness" are missing. That cannot mean
the United States would be entitled to pay the annual sums in the new debased gold
dollar as created by the President's proclamation of January 31, 1934. There is no doubt
that by Art. XIV of the Treaty, the weight of the dollar as existing in 1903 was con-
templated. As the United States was a party to the treaty, a closer definition may have
been considered superfluous.
155. For a discussion of these arguments see notes 72, 73, supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 74-78, supra, and accompanying text. The Panama case has at different
times been discussed by the daily press. See, for instance, the N. Y. Times, March 3, 1934,
at 7; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, March 2, 1934, at 14. Cf. Philippine case settled by Ameri-




entitled to assert, and had claimed, the right to protect its nationals hold-
ing the said bonds, and that the other party was also a government. 157 In
addition there was a special agreement between the interested govern-
ments for arbitration by the Permanent Court. Professor Verzijl, of the
University of Utrecht, attempts to draw from this precedent far-reaching
consequences for international law.18  First he asserts that the abro-
gation of the gold clause, to the detriment of foreign nationals, "undoubt-
edly" constitutes the violation of an international obligation. But he
furnishes no proof 9 Even the Permanent Court, arguing in substance
on the ground of international private law, is no authority for his con-
tention. Professor Verzijl alleges furthermore that by virtue of the
said violation jurisdiction of the Permanent Court could be invoked on
the ground of the so-called "optional" arbitration clauseIcO even by a
unilateral proceeding, insofar as governmental debts to private creditors
are concerned. He rests his opinion on an extensive interpretation of the
statute of the Permanent Court."" But it is not necessary to analyze
this interpretation, as the United States is not a member of the Perma-
nent Court, nor has it concluded treaties compelling it to submit without
further consent to any international court in a case like this.
The question of substantive international law remains. There are,
indeed, two examples of international disputes, settled by reestablish-
ment, in whole or in part, of the abrogated gold clause. One example is
the controversy between Germany and Switzerland with regard to the
German ordinance of September 28, 1914.02 As a number of Swiss banks
and insurance companies, owning gold mortgages on German real estate,
were, after the catastrophic depreciation of the mark, strongly affected
by the consequences of the ordinance, the Swiss government protested
against it, alleging that it was, with regard to foreign creditors, a breach
of international law. The dispute was settled by the German-Swiss gold
mortgage agreement ("Deutsch-Schweizerisches Goldhypothekenabkom-
men") of December 6 and 9, 19 20 ,i1s completed by an additional agree-
ment dated March 25, 1923.114 Germany acknowledged the validity of
the gold clause undertaken on behalf of Swiss creditors; and in return
157. CoviANrT or = LrEAuE oF NAOios, Art. XIV, 1 Gm= SPEcrAL Stours (1930).
158. Weekblad van Het Recht, No. 12654-6 (Oct. 1933).
159. The German-Swiss and the Guatenmla cases (infra, notes 163-166) are unkmown
to him. Nor does he envisage the possibility that the abrogation may constitute an excep-
tional measure against foreign creditors or some groups of them. In such a casa, viola-
tion of international public law may be existent.
160. FACH=R, TE PEn 7'amT CouRT OF ITEmNAioiAL JUsICE (London 1932) 3C0.
161. Pertinent is Art. 36 of the statute. See FAcHm, op. cit. supra note 160, at 271.
162. See note 37, supra.
163. R CEcSGES"z=A.uTr (1920) 2023.
164. id. 1923 II. 284.
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the latter granted a period of ten, and under certain contingencies, of
fifteen years for payment, and a reduction of interest.
In another international controversy on the gold clause, the United
States itself was a party. The President of Guatemala, in a decree dated
December 22, 1903, abrogated the gold clause,1' devaluating gold debts
by this means to the extent of five-sixths. 16 Owing to steps promptly
taken against this measure by the American and other governments, the
President on September 14, 1904, repealed the decree.
It may be mentioned finally that different statutes enacted during the
last few years to restrict gold clauses, have possibly provoked diplomatic
overtures. No official communication has been issued, so far as is
known, but bondholders have formed associations for the protection of
their common interests167 and it is said in the reports of these associations
that several governments have in certain European cases backed the
steps taken by them.
Under present conditions such efforts are not likely to be crowned with
success. The considerations which have been advanced to justify the
Joint Resolution and to overcome the difficulties presented by matters
of constitutionality and "ordre public" in private law will protect the
war and post-war restrictions of the gold clause in the field of public
international law as well. The two examples given where diplomatic
action resulted in reestablishment of the gold clause are not conclusive.
In the Swiss-German affair there were special economic facts requiring
Germany to comply with Swiss wishes. The Swiss banks and insurance
companies had issued bonds and life insurance policies in Swiss francs
and, to a very large extent, had invested the proceeds in German mort-
gages. These institutions were placed, by the abrogation of the gold
clause securing their funds, in an extremely dangerous predicament.
Political reasons and defaults in negotiations contributed to make the
German government recognize, in principle, the full validity of the gold
clauses. The treaty, however, was sharply criticized in Germany." 8
Predictions made at that time that it would prove impossible for Ger-
man debtors to bear the additional burden thus cast upon them have
been substantiated by later developments; indeed, the German govern-
165. See PAPErs RErATTNG TO TnE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STAT'rS, 1904 (Wash,
1905), 346-351.
166. See the letter of Messrs. G. Amsinck & Co. to Mr. Hay, American Secretary of
State, op. cit. supra note 165, at 348.
167. These associations are different from those discussed in Wynne and Borchard, Foreign
Bondholders Protective Organizations (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 281.
168. I refer to Nussbaum, Das Goldhypothekenabkommen mit der Schweiz in (1921)
RECHT uND WnRIsccArr 50 et seq. Particular data substantiating the reasoning of the
Court are given there.
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ment has with success refused to grant to other countries the same
benefit granted to Switzerland. Therefore, the German-Swiss treaty of
1920 can scarcely be alleged to be a good precedent. As regards the
Guatemala case, the fact that the President simply and plainly revoked
his decree does not argue in favor of the economic necessity of his
original measure. But be that as it may, the stress of the world economic
crisis has far transformed legal notions from those of 1903 and even of
1920. The existence in law of a claim can no longer be considered as
sufficient reason for upholding it. It seems, to a certain extent, unavoid-
able to weigh legal rights in the balance of economic and social justifica-
tion. There is more at stake than the gold clause. Maintenance of it
is not the last word of legal wisdom.
